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The Role of International Law in U.S. Constitutional
Interpretation: Original Meaning, Sovereignty and the
Ninth Amendment
1

Elizabeth Price Foley

The topic of this symposium—the role of international law in U.S.
constitutional interpretation—is intensely controversial. But make
no mistake about it: As with most issues of U.S. constitutional law, the
controversy is mostly political. Accepting this fact, the goal of this
essay is to explore the possibility of a political middle ground that recognizes a legitimate role for international law in U.S. constitutional
interpretation (something liberals desire), but only insofar as is consistent with original meaning (something conservatives desire). I will
then discuss briefly the specific example of the Ninth Amendment,
exploring how this Amendment’s original meaning may have contemplated the application of early international law principles relating to
sovereignty.
I. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW —JUST ANOTHER CHAPTER
IN THE ONGOING “CULTURE WAR”
A. How the Culture War Has Affected Law Generally
One of the problems with U.S. constitutional law generally is that
every major intellectual gray area has been hijacked by ideologues
with a broader political axe to grind. Issues as seemingly innocuous as
abstention, standing, and the Eleventh Amendment thus have become
battlegrounds in an ongoing culture war between the far right and far
left.
Zealots of the far right and far left obviously want to win the ongoing culture war, a political goal that does not necessarily require
fidelity to a written text or its underlying delicate intellectual compromise, brokered by a long-dead founding generation. And you can1
Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law. This article is based
substantially on a talk presented at a symposium to dedicate the new building for the FIU College of Law on Feb. 9, 2007.

27

28

FIU Law Review

[3:27

not really blame them. Why not take the easy route and try to get a
majority of the Court to simply “reinterpret” the Constitution in a
manner consistent with one’s preferred ideology? It provides a much
swifter and more satisfying victory. But, of course, this path to easy
constitutional victory is fraught with hazards of its own. It imposes
intense and sustained political attention and pressure on the Court. It
should come as no surprise, then, that Court nominations and opinions
have become increasingly contentious, vitriolic and fractured. And
when majority opinions do somehow miraculously emerge, all too often these precedents have the half-life of a fruit fly.
The American public is painfully aware of the political game being played with the Constitution. A recent poll showed that eightyfive percent of Americans think partisan backgrounds influence a
judge’s decisions, and more than half think judges actually decide cases based on personal beliefs rather than legal precedent or the Consti2
tution.
These events are not considered to be normatively desirable.
Nearly three out of four Americans think judges need to be more insulated from outside political pressure and make decisions based on
3
their reading of the law. A decisive super-majority of Americans thus
do not consider judges to be just another type of politician. And yet,
in the eyes of many, law and politics have become synonymous. This,
4
in turn, has undermined respect for law and the courts.
B. How the Culture War Has Affected U.S. Constitutional Interpretation
The broader culture war has spawned two main interpretive
camps in the realm of U.S. constitutional law: (1) the so-called “living
Constitution” adherents, who think that constitutional language
should be viewed as fluid, open to re-interpretation according to mod-

2
Press Release, Syracuse Univ., Maxwell Sch. of Citizenship and Pub. Affairs, Maxwell
Poll: Partisan Politics Colors Americans’ View of U.S. Courts, (Oct. 19, 2005), at 1, available at
http://sunews.syr.edu/story_details.cfm?id=2632. For the full text of the poll results, see Judges
and the American Public’s View of Them, Maxwell Sch. of Citizenship and Pub. Affairs, Syracuse
Univ. (Oct. 2005), available at http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/news/MaxwellPoll.pdf.
3
Judges and the American Public’s View of Them, Maxwell Sch. of Citizenship and Pub.
Affairs,
Syracuse
Univ.
(Oct.
2005),
available
at
http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/news/MaxwellPoll.pdf.
4
See ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY, LIBERTY FOR ALL: RECLAIMING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY
IN A NEW ERA OF PUBLIC MORALITY 5, 201 n.14 (2006) (discussing results of a 2005 poll by the
American Bar Association, which indicated widespread public dissatisfaction with the judicial
branch).
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5

ern preferences and norms; and (2) the so-called “originalists,” who
think that constitutional language should be viewed as fixed, revealing
a set of first principles that must be honored regardless of modern
6
exigencies or preferences.
The living Constitution shibboleth has great rhetorical appeal because it suggests that those who disagree with it must necessarily support a dead Constitution. After all, who wouldn’t prefer a living Constitution to a dead one? Rhetoric aside, however, it requires one to
accept that the Constitution rests on a foundation of sand. Modern
7
adherents of the living Constitution theory argue unabashedly that
there are no fixed principles that should guide constitutional interpre8
tation. Everything of importance is open to reinterpretation according to the preferences of the day. Judges are required to take important phrases in the text—such as Commerce, Privileges or Immunities,
Due Process, or Equal Protection—and assume that there are no underlying principles that can or should be ascertained in interpreting
their meaning. Because no underlying principles can be ascertained,
judges should feel free to ascribe whatever meaning they think is appropriate for the times. This is, of course, subjectivism run amok. It

5
See generally Charles A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV.
L. REV. 673 (1963). For a critique of the living Constitution approach, see William H. Rehnquist,
The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976), reprinted in 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 401 (2006). See also Edwin Meese III, A Return to Constitutional Interpretation from
Judicial Law-Making, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 925 (1996).
6
See generally Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
For an insightful critique of Justice Scalia’s self-professed version of originalism, see Randy E.
Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of ‘Faint-Hearted’ Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006).
For a critique of originalism generally, see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).
7
I intentionally say “modern” living Constitution adherents here, to distinguish them
from those of the founding generation, such as Thomas Jefferson, who appears to have accepted
a different version of the living Constitution idea. To Jefferson, constitutional principles could
not be discarded when inconvenient or unfashionable. These principles were articulated in
sufficiently broad and amorphous language as to permit the principles to adapt to modern times.
In his words, “Time indeed changes manners and notions, and so far we must expect institutions
to bend to them. But time produces also corruption of principles, and against this it is the duty of
good citizens to be every on the watch, and if the gangrene is to prevail at last, let the day be
kept off as long as possible.” LIBERTY FOR ALL, supra note 4, at xi. Jefferson also declared,
“Our peculiar security is in the possession of a written Constitution. Let us not make it a blank
paper by construction.” Id. at 1 (letter from Jefferson to Wilson Nicholas, 1803).
8
Perhaps one of the boldest proponents of the “living Constitution” theory is Professor
Bruce Ackerman, who asserts that changed understandings and desires from one generation to
the next can result in legitimate constitutional “amendment” in a way that does not require
resort to the amendment processes specified in Article V. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). For a critique of Ackerman’s attempt to legitimate the New
Deal Court’s “reinterpretation” of the Commerce Clause, see Elizabeth C. Price, Constitutional
Fidelity and the Commerce Clause: A Reply to Professor Ackerman, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 139,
157-67 (1998).
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makes constitutional law synonymous with politics in its rawest, ugliest form.
The living Constitution approach has the benefit of allowing the
Constitution to morph into whatever seems expedient or desirable at
any given moment. But it creates three distinct social harms. First, it
allows the judiciary to discard fundamental, structural features of
Constitution that were designed to protect individual liberty (e.g., federalism and limited government). Second, it undermines respect for
the Constitution itself as a meaningful set of principles divorced from
political ideology. I have found this problem to be especially acute
with young lawyers. Many young law students come into constitutional law as bright-eyed and bushy-tailed idealists, only to leave with a
cynical view that the Court’s disregard of text and its historical context has transformed the Constitution into a politically manipulable
document with very little or no real fixed meaning. To me, this is a
real and substantial societal loss. Third, the living Constitution theory
encourages political lethargy. It does so because it not only allows but
expects the judiciary to fix modern problems by simply doing an interpretive about-face. If the Constitution is malleable enough to
change with the times (without a formal amendment), there is obviously no need for We the People to get involved: the Court will fix
the problem and we can all get on with our busy lives—taking our
kids to soccer, eating our chicken nuggets, and paying our bills.
In this world of politically expedient constitutional reinterpretation, ordinary Americans are missing in action, cut out of any political
dialogue that precedes constitutional change. We have effectively given our proxy to the political extremists, who wield it on our behalf by
convincing our Supreme Court that constitutional change does not
require our formal involvement, Article V notwithstanding. The resulting political lethargy—which is, by the way, even greater among
9
minority groups —is dangerous to the proper functioning of our republican form of government.
So if the living Constitution theory is as bad as I claim it is, what
makes originalism any better? First, I confess that I find the originalism label to be a bit misleading. Contrary to most Americans’ understanding—including law students and law professors—there are several different kinds of originalism, and they present markedly differ10
ent approaches to constitutional interpretation. In either case, how9

See LIBERTY FOR ALL, supra note 4, at 202 n.18.
For a general discussion about the various shades of original intent originalism, see
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 9294 (2004); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1085, 1085-87 (1989) (describing various versions of original intent originalism).
10

2007] The Role of International Law in U.S. Constitutional Interpretation

31

ever, the originalists share the belief that constitutional text matters,
and that the text can and should be interpreted by reference to the
principles, political philosophy and events that motivated the proposal
and ratification of the text.
One of the biggest problems originalism faces is that its votaries
too often pretend that there is an answer to most or all questions of
constitutional interpretation that can be answered by simply polling
the Founders or their generation on any given issue. This is problematic because, in most instances, the issues presented for judicial resolution are issues that were either not foreseen by the founding generation (e.g., the Internet and its relationship to the First Amendment) or,
if they were foreseen, were not specifically debated and resolved in
any definitive way.
One need look no further than the modern Supreme Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence to see this problematic aspect of originalism rear its ugly head. To qualify as a fundamental right, modern
substantive due process jurisprudence generally requires that the activity in question be one that is “deeply rooted in our nation’s history
11
and tradition.” It then attempts to answer the “deeply rooted” inquiry by looking back to see whether early common or statutory law
allowed or condemned the activity in question. An historical prohibi12
tion of X, therefore, will equal no fundamental right to do X.

11

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). The Court reasoned:

Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition.’ Second, we have required in substantive-dueprocess cases a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. Our
Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial ‘guideposts
for responsible decisionmaking,’ that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due
Process Clause.
Id. at 720-21 (internal citations omitted).
This was evident in the majority opinion in Glucksberg, in which the Court rejected the
assertion that individuals have a substantive liberty to receive the aid of a physician in committing suicide. See id. at 723. The Court explained:
12

[W]e are confronted with a consistent and almost universal tradition that has long
rejected the asserted right, and continues explicitly to reject it today, even for terminally ill, mentally competent adults. To hold for respondents, we would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy
choice of almost every State.
Id. The Court’s recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas did not employ this typical “deeply
rooted” analysis in striking down the Texas anti-sodomy law on substantive due process grounds,
but this is apparently because the majority in Lawrence did not find the right of intimate associa-
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The requirement that fundamental rights have a deep history of
acknowledgement and acceptance has been driven and defended
13
principally by self-confessed originalists on the Court. They opine
that this substantive limitation on the recognition of fundamental
rights is necessary to prevent the judiciary from substituting its subjection to be “fundamental.” See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia argued:
Though there is discussion of “fundamental propositions,” and “fundamental decisions,” nowhere does the Court's [majority] opinion declare that homosexual sodomy is a ‘fundamental right.’ under the Due Process Clause; nor does it subject the
Texas law to the standard of review that would be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if
homosexual sodomy were a “fundamental right.” Thus, while overruling the outcome of Bowers, the Court leaves strangely untouched its central legal conclusion:
“Respondent would have us announce . . . a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. This we are quite unwilling to do.” Instead the Court simply describes petitioners' conduct as “an exercise of their liberty”—which it undoubtedly
is—and proceeds to apply an unheard-of form of rational-basis review that will have
far-reaching implications beyond this case.
Id. (internal citations omitted). Justice Scalia added:
The Court today does not overrule this holding. Not once does it describe homosexual sodomy as a “fundamental right” or a “fundamental liberty interest,” nor does it
subject the Texas statute to strict scrutiny. Instead, having failed to establish that the
right to homosexual sodomy is “‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,’” the Court concludes that the application of Texas's statute to petitioners' conduct fails the rational-basis test, and overrules Bowers' holding to the contrary. ‘The
Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into
the personal and private life of the individual.’”
Id. at 594 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
13 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 952-53 (1992)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the characterization of abortion as a ‘fundamental’ right because of its historical prohibition); Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 593
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (sharply criticizing the Lawrence majority’s failure to employ the “deeply
rooted” inquiry). In Bowers, the Supreme Court stated:
It is obvious to us that neither of these formulations would extend a fundamental
right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy. Proscriptions against
that conduct have ancient roots. Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and
was forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States when they ratified the Bill of
Rights. In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37
States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961, all 50 States outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District of Columbia continue to provide
criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and between consenting adults.
Against this background, to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is “deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition” or “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty” is, at best, facetious . . . .
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1986) (internal citations omitted). The Bowers decision was explicitly overruled in Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), but as I explain the previous
footnote, the Lawrence majority did not apply (much less overrule) the “deeply rooted” fundamental rights analysis, suggesting that the right to intimate association recognized in Lawrence is
not considered to be a fundamental right.
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tive countermajoritarian preferences for those of the more politically
14
accountable branches of government. Yet this approach is breathtakingly non-originalist.
First, notice what is going on here, as a matter of constitutional
interpretation: We are presumptively limiting fundamental rights status to those activities that were explicitly allowed by early common
and statutory law. And of course, a right that is not a “fundamental”
right is really no right at all, since it will be subject to rationality review, which requires the Court to uphold any restriction on the exercise of the non-fundamental right so long as the restriction serves
15
some arguably rational purpose.
Employing early common and statutory law as a litmus test for
the presumption for or against fundamental rights status puts the proverbial cart before the constitutional horse. If X was prohibited by
common or statutory law in the early days, the argument goes, we
must assume that the founding generation—unless they specifically
singled out X as a constitutional right in the text—must have wanted
to allow the prohibition of X to continue. Laws against suicide and
assisted suicide, for example, have been on the books since the early
days of the republic, as have laws against sodomy. These activities,
16
therefore, cannot qualify as fundamental rights.
This supposedly originalist analytical framework is patently ridiculous, since the Constitution was written in the broad language of
principles; it does not overrule common law or invalidate statutes by

14

See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. In Glucksberg, the Court explained:

[W]e have always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process
because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are
scarce and open-ended. By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right
or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public
debate and legislative action. We must therefore exercise the utmost care whenever
we are asked to break new ground in this field, lest the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the members of
this Court.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
15 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it
bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.”).
16 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710-15, 728 (cataloguing the historical prohibition against
suicide and assistance with suicide and concluding that this history required a finding that physician-assisted suicide was not a fundamental right); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193-94 (cataloguing the
historical prohibitions against sodomy); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568-70 (reconsidering the nature
of the historical prohibitions against sodomy). See also supra note 13 (exploring how the majority of the Court in Lawrence v. Texas did not appear base their holding on fundamental rights
analysis).
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name. We would be well advised to recall Chief Justice Marshall’s
sage observation about constitutional interpretation:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the
means by which they may be carried into execution, would
partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely
be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which
compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the
objects themselves. That this idea was entertained by the
framers of the American constitution, is not only to be inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the language. . . . [W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution
17
we are expounding.
Along these lines, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause did not mention the existing Jim Crow laws by name or even
segregation of public schools, but its underlying principle was undoub18
tedly antithetical to these laws. So when it comes to broad language
elsewhere in the constitutional text such as the word “liberty” in the
Due Process Clauses, why would a so-called originalist conclude that
the text endorses the validity of common or statutory prohibitions in
existence at the time of the text’s ratification? The answer, of course,
is that we should not. Our interpretive task, properly understood,
should be to ascertain the principles that animate the constitutional
text—in this case, the Due Process Clauses—and then compare these
principles against specific laws to determine constitutional compatibil19
ity.
17

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819).
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (declaring racial segregation in public
schools to be violative of the Equal Protection Clause). See also Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1093 (1995) (“[I]t is clear beyond
peradventure that a very substantial portion of the Congress [from 1871-1875], including leading
framers of the [Fourteenth] Amendment, subscribed to the view that school segregation violates
the Fourteenth Amendment. At a minimum, therefore, the scholarly consensus must be corrected to admit that this interpretation is within the legitimate range of interpretation on originalist grounds.”).
19 If one studies the history of the Due Process Clauses, it becomes clear that they embraced the concept of procedural fairness, much the same as the “law of the land” clause of the
Magna Carta. In this sense, the very concept of “substantive” due “process” is oxymoronic, both
as a textual and contextual matter. This is not to say, however, that there is no textual basis in the
Constitution for the recognition of unenumerated rights. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and/or the Ninth Amendment provide adequate textual and contextual support.
18
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Self-professed originalists’ use of the “deeply rooted” litmus test
for fundamental rights is even more perverse when one considers that
the old common and statutory law prohibitions that are being elevated to near-constitutional status are often laws that the original colonies inherited from Great Britain, which had a very different conception of government than our newly minted Constitution. In Britain, for example, the legislative branch (Parliament) had plenary power; it was a Leviathan that even possessed the power to define and
redefine the unwritten British Constitution. The British vision of parliamentary supremacy was a reflection of the fact that the British
people trusted their Parliament more than they trusted their monarch
or the monarch’s courts. In the newly independent States, as well as
the U.S., the people trusted none of their elected governors, preferring
to subject all branches of the government, including the legislature, to
a series of elaborate checks and balances to keep them within their
proper bounds.
My point is this: Why give any interpretive relevance at all to
common and statutory law that existed at the time of the ratification
of the relevant constitutional language? Yes, many of these common
law doctrines and statutes are hundreds of years old. But does this
make them presumptively constitutional? Surely not, for one important reason: Their ancient ancestry, rather than granting an imprimatur of constitutional acceptability, should make them inherently suspect, as they are byproducts of a system of government that embraced
plenary legislative power—a norm that Americans clearly rejected.
Colonial legislatures were mini-Parliaments, inheritors of the British
acceptance of legislative supremacy. They passed many laws, and
these laws were considered presumptively unassailable under thenexisting visions of legislative supremacy.
After the Constitution was ratified, moreover, these colonial and
early state laws generally could not be ruled unconstitutional because
the early Supreme Court, in Barron v. Baltimore, declared that the Bill
20
of Rights was not binding upon the States. Indeed, because the Supreme Court did not begin the process of “selective” incorporation of
the Bill of Rights until the early- to mid-twentieth century, there was
no legal basis for claiming that longstanding state laws violated the
Constitution. In a perverse sense, therefore, the Supreme Court’s delay in recognizing a constitutional source for the protection of unenumerated rights caused these early laws to become “deeply rooted.”

20 32 U.S. 243 (1833). For greater elaboration on the analytical defects of Barron, see
LIBERTY FOR ALL, supra note 4, at 27-33.
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Yet self-professed originalists on the Court today see no apparent
problem with freezing this early statutory/common law into place and
allowing it to drive our definition of fundamental rights. This so-called
originalist approach is at odds with both the broadly worded text of
the Constitution as well as the deeper principles animating the text,
both of which support a more generous conceptualization of individual rights.
I feel free to say all of these bad things about both living constitutionalists as well as the originalists because I do not consider myself to
have a horse in this political race, so to speak. I feel no emotional or
intellectual attachment to either liberal or conservative ideologies, and
I would simply like, as an ordinary American with some specialized
knowledge on constitutional law, to work towards an interpretive approach without regard to the political desirability of the outcomes that
may flow there from.
My own biases in constitutional interpretation, however, do exist,
and I think it is important to reveal them up front. First, I do consider
myself to be an originalist, though as you can see by the preceding
discussion of modern substantive due process jurisprudence, I have
many quarrels with the apparently outcome-oriented tactics of many
self-confessed originalists. But I do start from the position that text
matters. I do not think judges are free to discard the text when it
proves inconvenient or uncomfortable. Any perceived pragmatic
problems posed by the constitutional text should be overcome only by
21
the amendment processes specified in Article V. So if the constitutional text explicitly gives Congress a power to regulate bananas, it
would be illegitimate for the judiciary to interpret this as also giving
Congress a power to regulate oranges. And it would certainly be illegitimate to interpret it more broadly as a power to regulate all fruit or
food products more generally. But it’s precisely this “latitude of con22
struction”—as several prominent framers called it —that has become
an accepted modus operandi in constitutional interpretation.
21 U.S. CONST. art. IV (requiring that proposed constitutional amendments be approved by
two-thirds of both houses of Congress and ratified by three-quarters of the States).
22 The first real debate about accepting a latitude of constitutional construction occurred
in the context of considering the constitutionality of the first national bank. Several prominent
framers, most notably Madison and Jefferson, argued against a latitude of construction of the
Necessary and Proper Clause so broad as to grant Congress a power to create the national bank.
See James Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank, in 2 ANNALS OF CONG.
1949 (1791); see also Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank
(1791), in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 115, 117 (Melvin I. Urofsky & Paul Finkelman eds., 2002).
Of course it is clear that Hamilton’s latitudinarian approach to interpreting the Necessary
and Proper Clause ultimately prevailed (not Madison’s or Jefferson’s). See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). But this does not alter the conclusion that an interpretation of constitu-
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Second, I believe that interpreting constitutional text requires
understanding and honoring the historical context and political philosophy that animated the writing of the words. What identified problems were the words designed to solve? What did ordinary Americans
think the words were accomplishing? In this sense, I would align myself most closely with original meaning originalists. But regardless of
the specific originalist label one wishes to attach, my basic approach
clearly rejects the living Constitution theory.
Yet acknowledging that constitutional interpretation requires a
judge to ascertain the principles animating an often-amorphous text
does not mean that a judge should try to divine the subjective thoughts or beliefs of the founders. Indeed, it does not even require the
judge to ascertain what a majority of founders thought on the issue (if
indeed they thought about it at all).
Instead, it means that judges should try to understand the problems with antecedent forms of government that the founding generations were trying to solve, as well as their general political philosophy
about the nature of government itself—its purposes and its limits.
These generic principles can then provide the appropriate philosophical backdrop for ascribing meaning to an otherwise ambiguous text.
It is this type of originalism which I think most Americans can
embrace. It does not freeze statutory, common, or even constitutional
law into place, but recognizes that a judge’s job in interpreting the
Constitution is to honor the original vision of government—the relationship between the people and their elected governors—that is embodied in the text and the principles that animated that text. This interpretive approach allows the Constitution’s broad words to be interpreted to cover new technologies and events never dreamed of by
the founding generation, but only so long as the principles themselves
are not discarded when they prove politically or pragmatically inconvenient. In this narrower sense, the Constitution is a living document,
not because its text can be ignored or reinterpreted to fit modern political preferences, but because the text itself and its underlying principles are generally broad enough to accommodate modern applications.
In order to work, however, this interpretive method necessarily
requires that succeeding generations of Americans (most particularly
lawyers) be educated in the founding generations’ political philosophy—something which simply does not happen today, even in law
tional text that is inconsistent with its historical context is illegitimate. One need look no further
than the New Deal Court’s “reinterpretation” of the commerce power to see another, more
recent example of such illegitimate latitudinarian interpretation. See Price, supra note 8, at 15767.
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schools. Indeed, in most law schools, constitutional law has been condensed into a single-semester, four credit-hour course, leaving professors with barely enough time to teach the main constitutional cases,
much less a meaningful exegesis of the political philosophy of the relevant founding generations and the problems they were trying to
solve. All the average law student gets to see, therefore, is a bunch of
constitutional law cases that (not surprisingly) appear to be products
of the politics of their day.
This is a deep shame, since the original Constitution and subsequent amendments have often been motivated by a desire to solve
specific perceived problems, and they are often the product of a
shared political philosophy that can provide important first principles
to aid constitutional interpretation. Without a significant grounding in
the founding generations’ political philosophy, students simply cannot
see how far these cases have drifted from original understandings.
Students come to learn, in other words, that constitutional law is just
politics—and they assume that there is really nothing that can be
done to remedy this, even though they almost uniformly seem to think
this approach is normatively undesirable.
II. THE DEBATE ABOUT THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S.
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
What does all of the preceding mean for the debate about the
role international law should play in interpreting the U.S. Constitution? It means that the two interpretive approaches being passionately espoused are equally unattractive. The living constitutionalists
think that the U.S. should take into account international law when
23
interpreting the Constitution. Originalists, on the other hand, argue
that judges generally should not rely on international law as an aid to
24
interpreting the U.S. Constitution.

23 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Humankind”: The
Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 1 FIU L. REV. 27, 36 (2006).
As Justice Ginsburg explained her view:

The notion that it is improper to look beyond the borders of the United States in
grappling with hard questions, I earlier suggested, has a close kinship to the view of
the U.S. Constitution as a document essentially frozen in time as of the date of its ratification. I am not a partisan of that view. U.S. jurists honor the Framers' intent “to
create a more perfect Union,” I believe, if they read the Constitution as belonging to
a global 21st century, not as fixed forever by 18th-century understandings.
Id. at 36.
Seventh Circuit judge Frank Easterbrook puts it this way:

24
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Is it possible that there is a middle ground, one that would recognize a legitimate role for the use of international law that is consistent
with the founding generations’ understanding of the government they
established? I think the answer is yes. To the extent that the text or
historical context animating portions of the U.S. Constitution reflect
an acceptance of international law principles, an originalist should
consult these international law principles. These international law
principles would be not only salient to the originalist’s interpretive
quest, but indeed indispensable to it.
A. Which International Law Is Relevant?
A more contentious issue involves precisely which international
law principles matter: modern ones, or ones that existed at the time of
the founding? As an originalist, the answer must necessarily be the
international law principles that existed, were known and animated
U.S. constitutional text at the time the relevant text was ratified. This
approach would thus exclude modern international law and all its spe25
cifics. If one embraces the notion of fidelity to constitutional text,
this is a normatively desirable outcome. After all, international law
has come a very long way from the original Law of Nations well
known to the founding generation and written about by philosophers

There are two ways to commit the United States to international norms. The first is
the Treaty Clause: the President plus two-thirds of the Senate may bind courts and
citizens of the United States to a proposition on which they agree with other nations. The second is the Law of Nations Clause, which says that Congress may ‘define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences
against the Law of Nations’. This requires a majority in each chamber plus the President, or two-thirds in each chamber to override a veto.
There is no corresponding power in the judiciary to make any norm of international
law binding within the United States. . . . [T]he judiciary [cannot] insist that the government itself is bound by norms from outside our borders, and which our elected
representatives have not adopted and are not allowed to change.
Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreign Sources and the American Constitution, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 223 (2006). See also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack. L. Goldsmith, Customary International
Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997)
(arguing against acceptance of customary international law as binding federal law); Roger P.
Alford, The United States Constitution and International Law: Misusing International Sources to
Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57 (2004) (offering a comprehensive criticism of the
use of international law in interpreting the U.S. Constitution); John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin,
Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175 (2007) (discussing the
“democratic deficit” that results when U.S. courts rely on international law).
25 But cf. Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death
Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085 (2002) (arguing for the use of modern international law
principles to compel the determination that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment).
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such as Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, and Vattel. It is these
early international law principles—not the modern international law
offshoots that subsequently have developed—that originalists can and
should consult in interpreting the U.S. Constitution.
Living constitutionalists will not like this because it does not
achieve the desired goal of incorporating modern international law
into the U.S. Constitution. And given the political nature of constitutional discourse these days, many originalists will not like this either,
since it would require them to consult and sometimes be bound by
international law principles, allowing the camel’s nose to enter the
interpretive tent.
Extreme positions aside, however, what would it mean if early international law principles were deemed to be a legitimate source of
interpretive material for the U.S. Constitution? The full explication is
well beyond this short essay and would likely take many years to play
out jurisprudentially. But I will offer one example involving the Ninth
Amendment that I have discovered in my own research and which I
30
explore in more detail in my recent book.
B. The Ninth Amendment and the Early Law of Nations
The early international law—the Law of Nations—that was in
place at the time of the founding, offered a very rich and welldeveloped conception of sovereignty. To label someone as “sovereign” under the Law of Nations meant that that the person(s) in
31
whom sovereignty lodged was all-powerful. After all, sovereignty
was term borrowed from Biblical reference to God, the original sove32
reign. More specifically, to be sovereign under the Law of Nations

26

See e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (A.C. Campbell trans., 1901)

(1625).
27 See, e.g., EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF
NATURAL LAW (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758).
28 See, e.g., J.J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW (Thomas Nugent trans.,
2003) (1748).
29 See, e.g., 2 SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO
(C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather eds. & trans., 1934) (1688).
30 See LIBERTY FOR ALL, supra note 4, at 41-64.
31 See id. at 219 n.2 (citing numerous early Law of Nations sources defining the nature of
sovereignty).
32 See JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY: FOUR CHAPTERS FROM THE SIX BOOKS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH 46 (Julian H. Franklin ed. & trans., 1992) (1576). Bodin argued:

Since there is nothing greater on earth, after God, than sovereign princes, and since
they have been established by Him as His lieutenants for commanding other men,
we need be precise about their status so that we may respect and revere their majesty in complete obedience, and do them honor in our thoughts and our speech. Con-
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was to be legally autonomous, answerable to none. And all sovereigns were considered to be equal under the Law of Nations, and
hence entitled to equal respect in the international community (i.e., by
34
other sovereigns).
Under the Law of Nations, moreover, there was only one perceived limit to sovereign power. Because all sovereigns were equal,
they were not permitted to harm other sovereigns, except in self35
defense. Violation of this non-aggression principle was a violation of
the Law of Nations—and indeed, it is easy to see how this rudimentary harm principle is the seed from which the whole body of modern
international law has sprouted.
So what does this one example of early international law principles mean for U.S. constitutional interpretation? Its potential relevance is as follows. If the U.S. is a government of limited powers (as it
36
was undoubtedly meant to be), this suggests that We the People, in
forming our social compact (i.e., the Constitution) were the original
source of sovereign power—a conclusion long accepted by the Su37
preme Court. More specifically, whatever powers the people did not
give to the newly formed U.S. government, we either gave to our state
governments, or kept to ourselves. This is clearly the message of the
38
So by enumerating certain individual
Tenth Amendment.
rights—e.g., in the first nine amendments—the citizenry carved out
specific areas where our new, elected governors had “no power” over

tempt for one’s sovereign prince is contempt toward God, of whom he is the earthly
image.
Id.
33

See GROTIUS, supra note 26, at 62 (defining a sovereign as a person “whose actions are
not subject to the controul [sic] of any other power, so as to be annulled at the pleasure of any
other human will.”); PUFENDORF, supra note 29, at 1055 (saying of sovereignty that “no greater
liberty, setting aside the sovereignty of God, can be understood as belonging to individual men,
than the ability to dispose of their actions, strength, and faculties at their own judgment . . . . ‘To
do with impunity what one fancies is to be a king.’”); BODIN, supra note 32, at 4 (“For he is absolutely sovereign who recognizes nothing, after God, that is greater than himself. . . . [A] sovereign prince [ ] is answerable only to God.”).
34 See, e.g., BURLAMAQUI, supra note 28, at 196 (“[L]et us observe that the natural state of
[sovereign] nations in respect to each other, is that of society and peace. This society is likewise a
state of equality and independence, which establishes a parity of right between them; and engages them to have the same regard and respect for one another.”).
35 See LIBERTY FOR ALL, supra note 4, at 220 n.3 (citing numerous sources).
36 See Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 663 (1874) (“The theory of our governments, State
and National, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere. The executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches of these governments are all of limited and defined powers.”).
37 See, e.g., Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 308 (1795) (“The Constitution is the
work or will of the People themselves, in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity.”).
38 U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
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us. These rights are, in other words, areas in which We the People have
retained our original sovereignty: sovereignty to speak, worship God
as we see fit, bear arms, and even be kings and queens of our own castles by having freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, etc.
After specifying all of the areas of retained sovereignty that we
could foresee were important, We the People then stated, in the Ninth
Amendment, that the enumeration of these specific rights – by defining areas of no legitimate governmental power—“shall not be con39
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the People.”
The Ninth Amendment is thus a statement of what I have called
40
“residual individual sovereignty.” It says that just because the Constitution enumerates some specific areas of individual sovereignty (i.e.,
rights), those enumerations are not to be construed to mean that there
are no other rights deserving of constitutional protection. This basic
conception of the meaning of the Ninth Amendment is quite consistent with the context in which the Bill of Rights was ratified. After all,
the great fear articulated by the Federalists was that a Bill of Rights
would be “dangerous” because enumerating some rights would necessarily imply that the existence of greater governmental power to re41
strict individual liberty than originally granted. Relatedly, the Anti39 Id. at amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
40 LIBERTY FOR ALL, supra note 4, at 13-15. I should, however, acknowledge the strong
influence here of Joseph Story, who used the phrase “residuary sovereignty.” 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 752 (1833). Justice Story
wrote:

Being an instrument of limited and enumerated powers, it follows irresistibly, that
what is not conferred, is withheld, and belongs to the state authorities, if invested by
their constitutions of government respectively in them; and if not so invested, it is retained BY THE PEOPLE, as part of their residuary sovereignty.
Id. (capitals in original).
THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton explained:

41

I go further and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which they
are contended fork, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution but
would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers which
are not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim
more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done which there
is no power to do?
Id. See also Speech of James Wilson before the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 28,
1787), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, at 454. Wilson argued against an express bill of
rights:
In a government possessed of enumerated powers, such a [bill of rights] would be
not only unnecessary, but preposterous and dangerous. . . . If we attempt an enume-
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Federalists insisted on a Bill of Rights precisely because they feared
that the enumerated powers would be interpreted too broadly, there42
by encroaching upon individual liberty. Both Federalists and AntiFederalists, in other words, were ardent in their insistence that governmental powers not be so broadly interpreted as to invade the
realm of sovereignty retained by the people.
Madison’s careful attempt to prevent this widespread fear from
becoming a reality was embodied in the Ninth Amendment. In his
words:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it
would disparage those rights which were not placed in that
enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those
rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were
consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a

ration [of rights], every thing that is not enumerated is presumed given. The consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all implied power into the
scale of the government, and the rights of the people would be rendered incomplete.
Id.
42

See Speech of John Smilie before the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 28,
1787), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, at 456. Smilie argued that only a bill of rights could
stave off tyranny:
So loosely, so inaccurately are the powers which are enumerated in this constitution
defined, that it will be impossible, without a [bill of rights], to ascertain the limits of
authority, and to declare when government has degenerated into oppression. In that
event the contest will arise between the people and the rulers: “You have exceeded
the powers of your office, you have oppressed us,’ will be the language of the suffering citizen. The answer of the government will be short—“We have not exceeded
our power; you have no test by which you can prove it.” Hence, sir, it will be impracticable to stop the progress of tyranny.
See also Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Adams (Oct. 5, 1787), in 1 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, at 448. Lee concurred in this:
The corrupting nature of power, and its insatiable appetite for increase, hath proved
the necessity, and procured the adoption of the strongest and most express declarations of f that Residuum of natural rights, which is not intended to be given up to Society; and which indeed is not necessary to be given up for any good social purpose.
In a government therefore, when the power of judging what shall be for the general
welfare, which goes to the every object of human legislation; and where the laws of
such Judges shall be the supreme Law of the Land: it seems to be of the last consequence to declare in most explicit terms the reservations above alluded to.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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bill of right into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be
guarded against. I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see
by turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution [the
43
original Ninth Amendment].
If the Ninth Amendment is a statement that individuals have certain additional rights other than the ones specifically enumerated
elsewhere in the Constitution, then it is fair to say that the Ninth
Amendment is a place-marker for the concept of residual rights—i.e.,
residual individual sovereignty. This is an apt label because individual
rights, by definition, are conceptually the flip side of governmental
powers. Rights, in other words, are those areas where government has
no power over us, where we, as individuals, retain the power to follow
our own conscience and preferences. If Bill has a right to do X, this is
conceptually no different, under the American conception of negative
rights, than saying that the government has no power to interfere with
Bill when he engages in X. If the government has no power over Bill
when he engages in X, then ipso facto the power over X resides with
Bill. Bill’s right to do X is thus an example of Bill’s residual individual
sovereignty—a power he retains, as an individual, to do X if he wishes.
Some areas of individual sovereignty are of course enumerated
specifically in the text of the Constitution, such as the rights to speech,
assembly, bearing of arms, and so forth. Other areas of individual sovereignty, however, were textually acknowledged to exist by the Ninth
Amendment, though the impossibility of their complete enumeration
44
was obvious. Whether specifically enumerated or not, the Constitu43 The last clause of Madison’s fourth proposal (the original version of the Ninth Amendment) read:

The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of particular
rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution; but
either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.
James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in DOUGLAS KMIEC
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORY, CASES AND PHILOSOPHY 123 (2d
ed. 2004).
44 Cf. Speech by James Wilson to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Oct. 28, 1787),
in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, at 454. Wilson contended:
There are two kinds of government—that where general power is intended to be
given to the legislature, and that where the powers are particularly enumerated. . . .
[W]hen general legislative powers are given, then the people part with their authority, and, on the gentleman’s principle of government, retain nothing. But in a
government like the proposed one, ther ecna be no necessity for a bill of rights, for,
on my principle, the people never part with their power. Enumerate all the rights
of men! I am sure, sir, that no gentlmen in the late Convention would have attempted such a thing.
ET AL., THE AMERICAN
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tion thus accepts that individuals retained a great realm of sovereignty
even after they ceded certain specific powers to their governors. The
social compact entered into grants only certain powers to our governors, and We the People, both collectively and individually, retain the
great residuum of power.
The Ninth Amendment is thus a critical textual statement about
the limitations on governmental power, and concomitantly, the expansiveness of residual individual sovereignty. It is an express instruction
to the other branches of government—most notably the judiciary—
not to construe the existence of specifically enumerated rights to
mean that there are no others worthy of constitutional status and
hence, judicial protection. Sadly, this rather clear textual message has
been consistently ignored. In Robert Bork’s famous Senate confirmation hearings, he characterized the Ninth Amendment as an undecipherable “inkblot”—an interpretation that has been routinely em45
braced.
Rights not specifically enumerated within the constitutional text
have indeed been denied or disparaged. They have been formally
classified as second-class rights—a red-headed cousin, if you will, of
the judicially favored enumerated rights. And perhaps most ironic of
all, the jurisprudential presumption against recognition of unenumerated rights is embraced by self-identified originalists such as Bork.
One of the originalists’ primary excuses for this bizarre interpretive behavior is that there are no discernible standards for ascertainId.
45

Judge Bork stated in the Senate confirmation hearings:
I do not think you can use the Ninth Amendment unless you know something of
what it means. For example, if you had an amendment that says, “Congress shall
make no” and then there is an inkblot, and you cannot read the rest of it, and that
is the only copy you have, I do not think the court can make up what might be under the inkblot.
Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1 (1988)
(quoting Testimony of Robert Bork, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1987, at 22, col. 1). See also John Hart
Ely, The Ninth Amendment, in 1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND
MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 179 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989). Professor Ely remarks:
Occasionally a commentator will express a willingness to read [the Ninth Amendment] for what it seems to say, but this has been, and remains, a distinctly minority
impulse. In sophisticated legal circles mentioning the Ninth Amendment is a surefire way to get a laugh (“what are you planning to rely on to support that argument, Lester, the Ninth Amendment?
Id. Recent constitutional scholarship, however, increasingly challenges the orthodox inkblot
view. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 234-52 (2004); DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE “SILENT” NINTH
AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON’T KNOW THEY HAVE
(2007); Calvin R. Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 305 (1987).
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ing the existence of unenumerated residual rights. But this is where
understanding the original Law of Nations could help. It suggests a
framework for giving meaning to the Ninth Amendment—for removing the proverbial inkblot—that is based upon originalist principles.
If the Ninth Amendment is a statement about residual individual
sovereignty, then it requires that judges interpreting it understand
what sovereignty meant to the founding generation. The early international law texts provide this meaning rather clearly. As elaborated
earlier, under the Law of Nations as it existed at the founding, saying
that someone had sovereignty meant that they could do as they
pleased, so long as they did not harm other sovereigns (except in selfdefense). If the Ninth Amendment is a place-marker for the concept
of residual individual sovereignty, then it means that individuals have
other areas of sovereignty, not specifically enumerated, that are by
nature too numerous to list. We the People have kept the great residuum of power for ourselves, ceding only what was necessary for government to carry out its limited functions.
This residual sovereignty resides with each of us, giving us great
liberty to act as we please, subject only to the limitation originally understood to be placed upon sovereigns: that we exercise our sovereignty so as not to harm others. When viewed this way, the Ninth
Amendment becomes understandable and meaningful. It suggests
that there is implicitly a harm principle that should guide judicial construction of claims of unenumerated rights.
How precisely to define harm is a question I spend a good deal of
47
time on in my book and I will not repeat it here. Suffice it to say that
there is a relatively rich literature from the founding era regarding the
kinds of harms that were and normatively should be considered to be
legally cognizable. The larger point—for purposes of this article—is
that an originalist understanding of the Ninth Amendment would require consultation and fidelity to the conception of sovereignty embodied in the Law of Nations in existence at the time the Ninth Amendment was ratified. This, in turn, provides one relatively small example
of a situation in which acknowledging and incorporating international
law principles should be considered essential to the task of interpreting the U.S. Constitution.

46 See RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 45, at 235 (“The fear of the Ninth
Amendment, even by committed textualists/originalists, results in part from its apparently openended reference to unenumerated rights.”).
47 SEE LIBERTY FOR ALL, supra note 4, at 48-59.

